Monday, March 14, 2016

Lecture 3/ Sem 1, 2016: Hegel (1770-1831)



1.    Hegel was the first philosopher to provide a comprehensive synthesis permeated with the new consciousness of modernity. He fully appreciated the emergence of the new social realm and also incorporated both political and culture responses to the crisis of his times. However, Hegel is a transitional figure. Its as if in him the entire inheritance of the old world gathers itself up for a comprehensive restatement that attempts to incorporate the challenge of the new without entirely giving way to it. Biography. Hegel lived through one of the most tumultuous periods of European history. As a school he was an enthusiastic supporter of the French Revolution. His last article was a critique of the first English Reform Bill intended to curb some of the horrible excesses of industrialisation. These events symbolise the enormous changes that Hegel attempted to express in his philosophy.

2. Hegel’s early works address the practical problem of “positivity” or “diremption”. In general these terms referred to the contemporary political fragmentation of Germany, increasing social divisions and the collapse of public life and public virtue. This was especially vivid for a young man viewing things from the perspective of an idealised antiquity where religion was vital and inter-woven with all the other institutions and practices of life. This critique implies a negative evaluation of Christianity especially focusing on the lifeless and merely ritualistic status of contemporary religious ceremony and belief. Hegel viewed Christianity as a set of dogmas that no longer inspired contemporary believers and was unable to galvanise a sense of community. It introduced a split between the secular and the spiritual and prioritised the immortal soul of the individual. This had encouraged a retreat into private life and undermined the previously enthusiastic ancient taste for public life and political freedom.

3. The young Hegel placed great hopes on the French Revolution and the later impact of Napoleon as a modernising force in Southern Germany. The dream was that the remnants of the Ancien regime in Germany might be swept away leading to a radical rebirth of republican politics and culture. However, this dream failed to materialise. Hegel’s response to this disappointment was one, albeit a very important, ingredient of his final synthesis. We cannot go into all the dimensions of this synthesis; however, Hegel also draws from a variety of other contemporary theoretical and cultural resources like theoretical philosophy, economics, and theology to produce his mature vision.

4. Perhaps the principal reason for commencing this course with Hegel is that he takes up the challenge of incorporating his interpretation of modernity within a philosophical system in the shape of a new metaphysics of reality and history. Hegel wants to reconcile history and the standpoint of philosophy sub specia aeternitartis. He takes up the problem of conceptualising modern dynamism. He reaffirms the Enlightenment critique of tradition and wants to view the world as a product of freedom and intelligence. Simultaneously, he also recognises that abstract rationality is not the highest embodiment of this insight. Reason is a product of history; it is always embedded in a world and complemented by other cultural forces. This claim is redeemed through a critique of Kantian philosophy.

5. Kant’s philosophy is a systematisation of the Enlightenment view of man. The thinking subject is an individual but the individual is modelled on mankind in general: the so-called transcendental subject. Hegel views Kant’s philosophy as limited: in viewing mind as consciousness, it was little more than psychology rather than philosophy of mind. As the Kantian subject is a finite being, knowledge can only be finite and subjective and the question of the truth can never be settled. This latter point derives from Kant’s revolutionary critique of traditional metaphysics. The crux of this critique is the claim that we do not have access to knowledge of being, to things in themselves. We apprehend the world only through our own categories of reason, which provide us with the world as it is know to us: the world of appearances. But the ultimate reality of objects (Ding an sich) is beyond the grasp of finite intellect. Kant’s critical philosophy is in part a logical inquiry into the nature of the subjective understanding and its conceptual categories. But the transcendental consciousness that Kant’s reconstructs is nothing more than an abstract epistemological subject. While Hegel accepts Kant’s discovery of the genuine contribution made by finite understanding (its active synthesising role in cognition), he argued that philosophy had to pass beyond this purely critical phase. The object that Kant has designated as unreachable can only be recovered if the object is a spiritual product from the start.

6. He wants to think subjectivity comprehensively: this means spelling out its social, historical and theological presuppositions. Hegel will call this new subject Geist. Geist is really both subject and object, a mobile and active oscillation that is alternatively now one and then the other. When it others itself or alienates itself, this externalisation or positing (Entausserung) is something determinate and finite, while Spirit remains what it is despite this alienated content. In fact, spirit is that pattern of activity that relates what has been alienated from itself back to itself and therefore this knowledge/experience is transformed as a result. It is important to stress that Spirit does not transcend this constant activity but is this activity through which it brings to fruition the freedom and self-sufficiency that is already implicit in it. This constant activity is the immanent dynamism of both nature and history yet is not separate from these two realms. Spirit is the infinite, the absolute or the divine that must assume a multitude of finite shapes in order to fully realise its own potential for rationality and freedom. In nature spirit assumes primarily the external form of space whereas in history it is time. In this medium it comes to the realisation of itself through self-creating action and interpretation. Rejecting classical metaphysics, Hegel views reality not as being but as a becoming wherein this absolute subject is engaged in an incessant process of movement and repose, of formation and renovation. Thus Hegel injects the very dynamism of modern social life into philosophy.

7. For Hegel, Geist manifests itself in history in three aspects or moments:

(a) Subjective Spirit.

Geist attains its highest subjective expression in human self-consciousness. The freedom of the subject and the full self-realisation of his/her spirituality is the great new task of modernity. While there is, as we will see, a very strong emphasis on conditionality and contextuality in Hegel’s social theory, it is just as true that he sees the individual subject playing a vital, if ambivalent, role. They are the bearer of supra individual spiritual purpose, the universal, the red thread of rationality in history, but also the particular who develops their own designs, will and aspirations and requires a social space in which these can be fully developed and realised. The modern subject is a legal personality characterised as the bearer of rights, But for Hegel subjective spirit also refers to the power of the intellect that has the power to structure the manifold of experience and abstract universal meanings. However, this connotation of subjective spirit is limited by its empty formalism that does not refer to any particular object. But the greatest limitation of subjective spirit is that it s also conditioned and finite; it must be socialised into the inter-subjective symbolic world of culture and it will die. Seen from the perspective of the Absolute, of the perpetual activity that is spirit, individual finite subjects are inconsequential, merely momentary instantiations or bearers of an incessant processuality.

(b) Objective Spirit.

As a supra-personal subject, Spirit expresses inter-subjective meanings. It must therefore widen its field of inclusivity to encompass all of historical experience: this means the inter-subjective symbolic medium of living culture (language, mores and institutions). This is the symbolic soil in and through which individuals are socialised and come to recognise both him/herself and other human beings as human subjects. Hegel sees this very broadly as an array of cultural institutions and practices that attain their pinnacle in the institutional realm of state. These give concrete form and stability to the more dynamic and shifting mores and customs of a particular form of life. This objective form is a more lasting configuration of spirit yet ultimately still finite. Each particular concrete form of objective spirit is born, will flower into some coherent, creative shape and unity before diremption (social conflict) and decay finally set in. However, the death or decline of particular cultures should not induce despair. As just mentioned, Hegel believes that Spirit as incessant activity never dies. Other locals and communities provide resources from which the inheritance of the past is absorbed and new achievements forged. He views this cultural vitality as a unified process where Geist is always being augmented and reconstituted on a higher historical, social and cultural plane. Hegel will call this series of ascending shapes of spirit Historical Spirit. In the course of this spiritual journey spirit comes to a clear self-consciousness and self-recognition in the realm of culture as it slowly actualises its full potential. However, Hegel’s historically understandable Eurocentric focus is evident in the fact that there are some societies that play no real historical role in the evolution of history proper, that do not contribute directly to the upward march of spirit and are therefore perpetually so to speak occupants of history’s waiting room. From a contemporary perspective, this obviously signifies a major historical distortion.

(c) Absolute Spirit.

When reflected upon in art, religion and philosophy this self-consciousness is called by Hegel Absolute Spirit. We have seen that Hegel understands this absolute in terms of self-sufficiency and self-transparency. If we try to think of what something that can be both embodied and have these qualities then clearly the great cultural works come to mind. The great works of high culture may be historical creations. We especially view them as the spiritual objectivations of concretely located individuals and cultures. However, in Hegel’s time the domain of culture has a timeless quality and value: once created, works appeared to have an independent, autonomous existence and a timeless validity expressive of their essential spiritual truth. Think of the great contemporary debates over the interpretation of the bible or the constitution. There is a fundamentalist or black letter understanding compared to another that requires a  more historicising attempt to interpret the essential truth of the source in the light of contemporary conditions and changing circumstances. But for Hegel these cultural forms are a reservoir of essential spiritual values that tell the story of human spirit’s increasing self-consciousness, of its journey to absolute self-knowledge.

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